Dimensions of Generative AI Evaluation Design

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Abstract

There are few principles or guidelines to ensure evaluations of generative AI (GenAI) models and systems are effective. To help address this gap, we propose a set of general dimensions that capture critical choices involved in GenAI evaluation design. These dimensions include the evaluation setting, the task type, the input source, the interaction style, the duration, the metric type, and the scoring method. By situating GenAI evaluations within these dimensions, we aim to guide decision-making during GenAI evaluation design and provide a structure for comparing different evaluations. We illustrate the utility of the proposed set of general dimensions using two examples: a hypothetical evaluation of the fairness of a GenAI system and three real-world GenAI evaluations of biological threats.

1 Introduction

Evaluating the capabilities and risks of generative AI (GenAI) models and systems is crucial for their successful development, deployment, and adoption. Despite this, many would likely agree with *New York Times* columnist Kevin Roose's recent characterization of the current state of GenAI evaluation as "a mess—a tangle of sloppy tests, apples-to-oranges comparisons and self-serving hype" [\[16\]](#page-4-0). Even benchmarks, which have been viewed as the gold standard for measuring progress in GenAI model development, are coming under criticism. Writing in the context of responsible AI, the 2024 AI Index Report identified "a significant lack of standardization in responsible AI reporting" wherein leading model developers test their models against different benchmarks, which the authors suggest "may reflect existing benchmarks becoming quickly saturated, rendering them ineffective for comparison" [\[11\]](#page-3-0). Furthermore, as NIST has observed, "measuring risk at at an earlier stage in the AI lifecycle may yield different results than measuring risk at a later stage," such as when a model becomes integrated into a system [\[13\]](#page-3-1). All in all, there are few principles or guidelines to ensure evaluations are effective, often making it unclear which approaches are suitable for which specific evaluation objectives. What GenAI evaluation lacks, in other words, is a systematic understanding of *evaluation design*. To help address this gap, we propose a set of general dimensions that capture critical choices involved in GenAI evaluation design. Situating evaluations within these dimensions draws attention to important choices that might otherwise be overlooked—either when designing evaluations or evaluating them.

Although several prior papers have provided useful decompositions for understanding GenAI evaluations, they are limited to specific types of evaluations, or evaluations of particular concepts. This includes work on disaggregated evaluations [\[1\]](#page-2-0), sociotechnical safety evaluations [\[17\]](#page-4-1), evaluations with respect to the "socio-technical gap" [\[10\]](#page-3-2), human interaction evaluations [\[6\]](#page-3-3), and LLM benchmarks [\[4\]](#page-3-4). We argue that key insights can be drawn by considering a set of general dimensions that are relevant to evaluations of *any* GenAI model or system with respect to *any* concept related to its capabilities or risks. The concept of interest, such as reasoning ability or stereotyping, is crucial, and numerous taxonomies of capabilities and risks provide different options to consider [e.g., [2,](#page-3-5) [3,](#page-3-6) [8,](#page-3-7) [9\]](#page-3-8). Just as important is the object of the evaluation—be it a model, a system, or a component thereof. However,

Table 1: Left: Our proposed set of general dimensions that capture critical choices involved in GenAI evaluation design. Right: How three GenAI evaluations of biological threats, conducted by RAND [\[12\]](#page-3-9), OpenAI [\[14\]](#page-3-10), and Google DeepMind [\[15\]](#page-4-2), might be situated within these dimensions. (Shaded cells for a dimension indicate evaluations that have the same value for that dimension.)

once the concept and object have been specified, an evaluation designer is left with multiple critical choices about the most appropriate methodology for evaluating that object with respect to that concept.

2 Dimensions and Examples

Building on [Barocas et al.'](#page-2-0)s work on disaggregated evaluations [\[1\]](#page-2-0), we propose a set of general dimensions that capture critical choices involved in GenAI evaluation design and are relevant to evaluations of any GenAI model or system with respect to any concept. As shown in the left side of Table [1,](#page-1-0) these dimensions include the evaluation setting, the task type, the input source, the interaction style, the duration, the metric type, and the scoring method. We arrived at these dimensions by examining numerous evaluations, though they are not exhaustive and alternatives are likely possible.

To illustrate the utility of this set of general dimensions, consider evaluating the fairness of a GenAI system. The concept of interest in such an evaluation might relate to events that compromise fairness, such as system outputs that stereotype, demean, or erase certain social groups, or to the negative fairness-related impacts of those events, such as reinforcing unjust social hierarchies. The particular concept chosen will affect the methodology that is most appropriate for evaluating the system. The dimensions can help evaluation designers at this stage by drawing attention to various important choices that might otherwise be overlooked. If we are evaluating the system with respect to system outputs that stereotype, the evaluation might take place in a lab setting during a single session with inputs obtained from a variety of sources. However, if we are evaluating the system with respect to reinforcing unjust hierarchies, longitudinal field tests might be more appropriate with inputs provided by humans in iterative interactions with the system. In some cases, multiple complementary evaluations that represent different points on these dimensions may be needed to shed light on a particular concept.

As a non-hypothetical example, consider three real-world GenAI evaluations of biological threats. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) [\[2024\]](#page-3-11) noted that GenAI systems can lower barriers to entry for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) attacks and called for "a standard framework... for pre-release evaluation and red teaming of AI models." Although no such standard framework currently exists, there is a growing body of work on evaluating GenAI models and systems with respect to CBRN threats. Table [1](#page-1-0) shows our codings for how three recent GenAI evaluations of biological threats, conducted by RAND [\[12\]](#page-3-9), OpenAI [\[14\]](#page-3-10), and Google DeepMind [\[15\]](#page-4-2), are situated within the dimensions. Several insights emerge from this: (A) All three evaluations used human expert scoring, which may indicate that human judgment is essential for assessing complex biological threats, or it could suggest the need to explore alternative scoring methods. (B) RAND and OpenAI's evaluations both involved human subjects generating inputs to a GenAI system with iterative

interactions, while Google DeepMind's human evaluators worked with experts to create adversarial inputs for prompting a GenAI model with single-turn interactions. The former seems more consistent with the concerns DHS [\[5\]](#page-3-11) voiced about lowering barriers to entry for human actors, while the latter might offer a more direct assessment of the model, avoiding the noise introduced by the variation in human subjects. (C) While all three evaluations used different metric types, both RAND and OpenAI's evaluations used relative metrics, comparing outputs produced by multiple sets of human subjects, some with only access to the internet and others that also had access to a GenAI system. This choice aligns with calls to assess the marginal risks of AI [\[7\]](#page-3-12). In contrast, Google DeepMind's evaluation, which is still under development, focused on the incidence of "problematic" outputs [\[15\]](#page-4-2).

3 Discussion

As the above examples illustrate, situating evaluations within our proposed set of general dimensions can draw attention to important choices that might otherwise be overlooked—either when designing evaluations or evaluating them. Specifically, the dimensions can guide decision-making during GenAI evaluation design, helping evaluation designers determine the most appropriate methodology for evaluating a particular GenAI model or system with respect to a particular concept. The dimensions can also provide a structure for comparing different evaluations. Given the critical role of evaluations in the successful development, deployment, and adoption of GenAI models and systems, we hope that our proposal encourages a more methodical and explicit approach to GenAI evaluation design.

4 Broader Impacts

By situating GenAI evaluations within a set of general dimensions, this paper seeks to address the current lack of principles or guidelines for GenAI evaluation design. We hope this will lead to a number of positive impacts, including improving evaluations, enhancing our collective understanding of the capabilities and risks of GenAI models and systems, and supporting their responsible development, deployment, and adoption. However, there are also potential negative impacts that must be considered and mitigated. First, there is a risk that the relatively small number of dimensions we proposed could give an illusion of simplicity, leading evaluation designers and other stakeholders to miss the necessary nuance involved in designing and conducting effective evaluations. Similarly, if these dimensions prove generally useful, there is a risk of overfocus, causing evaluation designers to overlook other important choices that are not captured by them. As we further expand on the work described in this paper, we can mitigate these potential negative impacts by articulating clear guidelines for their use and non-use, as well as encouraging the development of alternative structures for GenAI evaluation design.

5 Limitations

It is possible that particular types of GenAI evaluations require other dimensions that we have not yet identified. In the future, we will seek to identify any gaps in our proposed set of general dimensions.

To enhance the practicality of the dimensions, it would be beneficial to provide concrete examples of what can and cannot be learned from a GenAI evaluation given a particular choice. Such examples would help evaluation designers understand the implications of their choices and improve the overall utility of the dimensions. Additionally, to gain a deeper insight into the effectiveness of the dimensions, it is essential to apply them to a broader spectrum of evaluations across various concepts and objects. This expanded application would allow us to discern patterns and make further refinements.

Finally, although we demonstrated how to examine existing GenAI evaluations, such as three real-world GenAI evaluations of biological threats, we touched only briefly (and hypothetically) on using these dimensions to design new evaluations. This gap highlights the need for further research.

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